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Law in a Vacuum: The Common Heritage Doctrine 
in Outer Space Law 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The success of the space programs of the United States! and the Soviet Union 
has demonstrated the feasibility of space use and has spurred the development 
of economically practical space activity.2 While space activity has increased, the 
world community has had increasing difficulty agreeing on specific rules of 
conduct to govern space use. 3 Existing space law is based on broad theoretical 
principles contained in the first international agreement governing space use 
sponsored by the United Nations. 4 These broad principles were sufficient to 
guide space use during the formative years of the space age, but as space activity 
has flourished, space law has lagged behind.s Specifically, states attempting to 
formulate rules to govern specific space activities have not agreed on the mean-
ing of space law principles.6 
One of the earliest declarations concerning the legal staLus of outer space was 
that all states are free to explore and use space.7 This broad declaration, how-
ever, has not proved workable for space activities functionally related to earth. 
For example, while all states may operate satellites, the world community has not 
accepted unrestricted satellite use for remote sensing of the earth surfaces or 
direct broadcasting of television programs. 9 Another early declaration of space 
1. One example is the successful landing on the moon by the U.S. Apollo II mission, July 20, 1969. 
See TIME, July 25, 1969, at 10. 
2. Ambassador Peter Jankowitsch, chairman of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space, noted some of the possible uses of outer space at the committee's 1979 session: 
We are now seriously considering daily flights into orbit which might serve and supply large 
technical facilities such as research laboratories, ... manufacturing facilities, or communica-
tions centers. We are also considering ... erecting large structures in space ... that could be 
part of a large solar experiment. And, finally, we are examining the possibility of setting up 
large, earth-like communities several hundred thousand miles up in space. 
34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) Annex I, at 30, U.N. Doc. AJ3420 (1979), quoted in Menter, Commercial 
Participation in Space Activities, 9 J. SPACE L. 53, 55 (1980). 
3. Galloway, Perspectives of Space Law, 9 J. SPACE L. 21, 24 (1981). 
4. Treaty Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 
[hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty]. 
5. See Haanappel, The Stagnating Devewpment of international Space Law and its Causes, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 22ND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 149 (M. Schwartz ed. 1979). 
6. See infra § III.A. 
7. G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. AJ5100 (1961). 
8. See infra § III.A.2 for a discussion of remote sensing satellites. 
9. See infra § III.A.1 for a discussion of direct broadcasts by satellite. 
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law was that the exploration and use of outer space is the province of mankind.10 
This idea is repeated and expanded in the proposed Agreement Governing the 
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,l1 (the Moon Treaty), 
which states that the moon and other space resources are the common heritage 
of mankind. 12 From each of these declarations flows the proposition that benefits 
from space shall accrue to all mankind. The principle of common heritage, 
however, has not received worldwide acceptance,13 
This Comment focuses on the difficulties the world community has had in 
interpreting and applying space law principles. In particular, the author discus-
ses the problems arising from states' differing interpretations of the principle of 
freedom of outer space and the principle of common heritage. The author 
explores the viability of these principles in the context of current political and 
economic world realities and suggests that the principles may yet become func-
tional rules of international law. 
II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE LAW 
A. Efforts by the United Nations 
The space age was born in an atmosphere of international cooperation and 
cold war tension. The first U.S. and Russian satellite programs were under-
taken as part of International Geophysical Year,14 (IGY), when more than 
seventy states cooperated in scientific experiments around the world. 15 During 
10. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. I. 
11. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 34 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 20) 33, U.N. Doc. AI~1420 (1979) (opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Moon Treaty). 
12. [d. art. Xl. 
13. Stt infra § III.B.2. 
14. "International Geophysical Year, commonly known as IGY, was the 30 month period from 
July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1959, during which a worldwide program of geophysical research 
was conducted." 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 414 (W. Benton ed. 1970). 
15. [d. at 414. "IGY represented an unparalleled enterprise in international scientific cooperation. 
More than seventy nations and 30,000 scientists and observers participated in operating several thou-
sand scientific stations reaching from pole to pole. IGY was directed toward a systematic study of the 
earth and its environment and included eleven fields of geophysics. In addition, two novel programs, 
rocketry and artificial earth satellites, were involved." [d. 
"An enormous amount of data was collecJed during IGY, much of which was immediately applicable to 
such fields as meteorology and atmospherics. Important discoveries were made concerning the compos-
ition and structure of the earth and the earth's atmosphere. The discovery of the Van Allen radiation 
belt through the use of space probes and satellites provided the basis for a unified description of 
variations of the earth's magnetic field, the aurora, and solar particles." [d. at 417. "IGY was the basis for 
the Antarctica Treaty, which consecrated the polar region to scientific, peaceful uses - the first instance 
in which such a portion of the earth has been set aside." [d. at 418. See generally S. CHAPMAN, INTERNA-
TIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR: YEAR OF DISCOVERY (1959); F. Ross, PARTNERS IN SCIENCE; THE ScIENTIFIC 
DISCOVERIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL Yf:AR (1961). 
-----------
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the thirty month IGY interval, the United States and Russia launched twelve 
satellites and five space probes, providing significant data on cosmic rays, magne-
tic fields, solar radiation, cloud cover and composition of the ionosphere.1 6 The 
successful launch by the Soviet Union of the first earth orbiting satellite, Sputnik 
1, on October 4, 1957, however, also marked the beginning of the space race 
between the Soviet Union and the United StatesY 
1. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
Following the launch of Sputnik 1, the United Nations recognized the need for 
an international forum to discuss matters relating to outer space. IS On December 
13, 1958, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution,19 
over Soviet bloc dissent,20 establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (the Ad Hoc Committee). The purpose of the committee 
was to report on the legal problems which might arise in relation to space 
activities.21 In addition, the committee was to report on international ventures 
which could appropriately be brought under the auspices of the United Na-
tions.22 
The Ad Hoc Committee23 convened in May 1959, despite announcements by 
16. 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 417 (W. Benton ed. 1970). 
17. Marking a Quarter Century of u.s. Satellites in Space, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 28, 1983, at I, 
col. I. 
/d. 
Explorer I, (the first American satellite), was more than a technological triumph. It symbolized 
the emergence of a new determination in a country that, having been knocked off its feet, (by 
the Soviet launch of Sputnik I), was picking itself up to run what it perceived to be a long-term 
race. 
18. The regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, in Fall 1958, was the first 
occasion when substantial numbers of states expressed official positions on the status of outer space. As 
early as March 17, 1958, the Soviet Union had submitted a proposed agenda item, U.N. Doc. Al3818 
(1958), banning the use of space for military purposes and calling for international cooperation in the 
study of space. The Soviets also proposed a United Nations agency to serve as a world center for the 
collection, mutual exchange, and dissemination of space related information. See Taubenfeld, Considera-
tion at tM United Nations of tM Status of Outer Space, 53 AM. ]. INT'L L. 400, 400 (1959). 
19. G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. Al5414 (1958). 
20. Jessup & Taubenfeld, TM United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on tM Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 53 
AM.]. INT'L L. 877, 877 (1959). Although the Soviet Union was among the first states to propose United 
Nations discussion of outer space, see supra note 18, the General Assembly rejected the Soviet proposal 
since the committee envisioned by the Soviet proposal consisted predominantly of Soviet satellite states 
and other Soviet allies. Taubenfeld, supra note 18, at 41. The resolution finally adopted was based on a 
draft proposal submitted by twenty nations, including the United States. Id. at 402. The Soviet dissent 
was thus presumably motivated more by cold war politics than by Soviet disagreement with the content 
of the resolution. See generally Taubenfeld, supra note 18, at 402. 
21. Jessup & Taubenfeld, supra note 20, at 877. 
22. For a text of the resolution, see YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1958, at 22-23 (Office of 
Public Information ed. 1958). 
23. The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czecho-
slovakia, France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, Russia, the United Arab Republic, 
England, and the United States. 
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Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Russia that they would not attend.24 The committee 
finished its work and approved its report25 to the General Assembly on June 25, 
1959.26 In its report, the Ad Hoc Committee stressed the need to find ways of 
enabling all nations, at all levels of development, to participate in space pro-
grams.27 The committee also recommended the creation of a special committee 
of the General Assembly to study measures to facilitate international cooperation 
and to provide a focal point for such cooperative activities.28 The Ad Hoc 
Committee concluded that action by the United Nations relating to space ac-
tivities should be limited to promoting and coordinating international coopera-
tion.29 
2. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
On December II, 1959, twelve powers30 submitted a draft resolution to the 
United Nations, which recognized the common interest of mankind in furthering 
the peaceful uses of outer space and which called for the establishment of a 
standing committee to work toward this end.32 One day later, on December 12, 
1959, the General Assembly unanimously33 adopted the resolution34 and estab-
lished the United Nations Committee On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space35 
(UNCOPUOS). The resolution36 requested that UNCOPUOS study the nature 
of legal problems which might arise from the exploration of outer space37 and 
facilitate an international convention of scientists to exchange information relat-
ing to space activity.38 
24. Jessup & Taubenfeld, supra note 20, at 877. The Soviet bloc announcement seems to have been 
the result of cold war politics. See supra note 20. 
25. U.N. Doc. N4141 (1959). 
26. U.N. Doc. NAC.981SR.6 (1959). 
27. 1958 YEARBOOK, supra note 22, at 25. 
28. [d. at 27. See also Jessup & Taubenfeld, supra note 20, at 881. 
29. Jessup & Taubenfeld, supra note 20, at 881. 
30. The original committee consisted of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, England, France, India, Japan, 
Poland, Romania, Sweden, Russia, the United Arab Republic, and the United States. 
31. U.N. Doc. NC.lIL.247 (1959). 
32. 1958 YEARBOOK, supra note 22, at 27. 
33. [d. at 28. The full vote was seventy-four in favor, none against, with one abstention. [d. 
34. G.A. Res. 1472, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. N4354 (1959). The resolution as 
adopted was essentially identical to the draft proposal submitted by the twelve powers, see supra text 
accompanying note 25, with the addition of an amendment by Belgium designed to make clear that the 
proposed scientific conference would be a conference of interested members of the United Nations. See 
U.N. Doc. NC.1IL.248 (1959). 
35. The original committee consisted of Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Canada, England, France, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, 
Mexico, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Russia, the United Arab Republic, and the United States. 1958 
YEARBOOK, supra note 22, at 28. 
36. For the full text of G.A. Res. 1472, see 1958 YEARBOOK, supra note 22, at 27-28. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. 
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Following a procedure adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee,39 UNCOPUOS 
established two subcommittees: the Technical and Scientific Subcommittee and 
the Legal Subcommittee.<o The purpose of the Technical and Scientific Sub-
committee was to provide a framework for the discussion and dissemination of 
the results of space research and to assist UNCOPUOS on questions of science 
and techno!ogy.41 The purpose of the Legal Subcommittee was to study the 
nature of legal problems arising from space use and to formulate agreements in 
response to the problems perceived.42 The close working relationship between 
the two subcommittees has facilitated the development of legal principles re-
sponsive to the needs of law, science, and technology.43 
Decisions of UNCOPUOS and its subcommittees are made on the basis of 
consensus. 44 UNCOPUOS realized that the most authoritative manner of pro-
ceeding in this new area of human activity would be through common apprecia-
tion of problems and common agreement on solutions. 45 As a result, UN-
COPUOS adopted consensus as the most acceptable procedure for decision 
making.46 The principle has worked well to date,47 notwithstanding the fact that 
UNCOPUOS includes countries with different systems of jurisprudence, politi-
cal philosophy, social customs, and levels of economic development.48 The suc-
cess of consensus as a method of decision making seems to indicate at least 
roughly parallel interests among member nations in securing outer space for 
peaceful purposes.49 
39. See Jessup & Taubenfeld, supra note 20. at 878. 
40. See Hosenball, The United Naticms Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Past Accomplishments 
and Future Challenges, 7 J. SPACE L. 95, 96 (1979). All member states of UNCOPUOS are represented on 
both subcommittees. [d. The subcommittees report to the parent committee at the end of each session. 
[d. 
41. [d. at 97. 
42. See YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1959 at 27 (Office of Public Information ed. 1959). 
43. I MANUAL ON SPACE LAW xii (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee eds. 1979). 
44. Galloway. Consensus Decision Making by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space. 7 J. SPACE L. 3. 3 (1979). Consensus decision making should be distinguished from unanimnous 
voting requirements. Consensus is achieved through negotiation and compromise without voting. 
whereas voting is required for a unanimous record. [d. at 3. 
45. Hosenball, supra note 40, at 96. 
46. [d. Consensus is also desirable as a means of achieving international accord because: (1) the 
process of seeking agreement continues with mutual give and take; (2) adoption of a course of action by 
simple majority could not be successfully implemented if dependent on participation by states not in 
favor; (3) group solidarity in decision making ensures maximum compliance in maintaining activity 
directed toward general benefit. See Galloway. supra note 44, at 5. 
47. Hosenball, supra note 40, at 96. Through the process UNCOPUOS has formulated four space 
treaties which have entered into force. For full names and citations. see infra notes 51-53. This record 
seems to indicate the success of consensus decision making within UNCOPUOS, but the process has 
been criticized as increasingly cumbersome and as adding to the stagnation of international space law. 
See Haanappel. supra note 5. at 150. 
48. Hosenball. supra note 40. at 97. 
49. [d. at 97. 
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From 1958 to 1974, the Legal Subcommittee produced four space treaties 
which have entered into force. These are The Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty);50 The 1968 Agree-
ment on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Space;51 The 1972 Convention on International Liability 
for Damage Caused by Space Objects;52 and The 1974 Convention on Registra-
tion of Objects Launched into Outer Space.53 Of the four treaties, the Outer 
Space Treaty is the most important because it articulates the fundamental prin-
ciples of outer space law and is generally accepted as the basic charter or 
constitution governing outer space.54 
B. The Outer Space Treaty 
The early work of UNCOPUOS resulted in General Assembly Resolution 
1721,55 of December 1961, which commended three guiding principles to states. 
The resolution declared that international law and the charter of the United 
Nations should apply in outer space,56 that space is free for exploration and use 
by all states,57 and that outer space is not subject to national appropriation.58 Six 
years later these principles were codified in the Outer Space Treaty.59 
The Outer Space Treaty states, "outer space shall be free for exploration and 
use by all states,"60 and "parties to the Treaty shall be guided by principles of 
cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct their activities in outer 
space with due regard for the corresponding interests of all other states party to 
the Treaty."61 In addition, the treaty states: "The exploration and use of outer 
50. Outer' Space Treaty, supra note 4. 
51. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Space, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (effective Dec. 3, 
1968). 
52. The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 
T.I.A.S. No. 7762 (effective Oct. 9, 1973). 
53. The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 
No. 8480 (effective Sept. 15, 1976). 
54. Hosenball, supra note 40, at 98. 
55. G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). 
56.ld. 
57. /d. 
58.ld. 
59. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4. To date, over ninety countries have ratified the Outer Space 
Treaty, leading one writer to conclude: 
In a remarkably short time after the first Sputnik was launched in 1957, a universal consensus 
was reached on the two fundamental principles that were to govern this new medium, namely, 
that outer space is free for exploration and use and is not subject to national appropriation. 
S,e Goedhuis, The Changing Legal Regime of Air and Outer Space, 27 INT'L lie COMPo L. Q. 576,582 (1978). 
60. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1. 
61. Id. art. IX. 
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space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries ... 
and shall be the province of mankind."62 Furthermore, the treaty states: "Outer 
space including the Moon and other celestial bodies is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means."63 
The Outer Space Treaty represents the first attempt to establish rules of 
conduct guiding mankind's passage into a new dimension.64 As a result of the 
previous conquest of the earth's physical environment65 on the high seas and in 
the air, ideas and concepts for the governance of outer space existed before the 
first spacecraft was ever launched.66 Outer space itself, however, was a legal 
vacuum, devoid of preexisting rules and presenting mankind with a unique 
opportunity to explore new legal and political frontiers. The Outer Space Treaty 
is remarkable for its attempt to establish a firm foundation upon which to build a 
legal framework to foster international cooperation and peace in outer space.67 
C. The Conceptual Basis of Space Law 
The realization that "anarchy in space could be more dangerous than anarchy 
on earth"6H made clear to the United Nations the need for rules governing 
space.69 The sources UNCOPUOS drew on in formulating the Outer Space 
62. [d. art. I. 
63. [d. art. II. The complete principles contained in the Outer Space Treaty have been summarized 
as follows: 
The treaty reflects a broad international consensus that outer space and celestial bodies are to 
be free for exploration and use for the benefit of mankind; that the principles of international 
law are applicable thereto; that celestial bodies are to be devoted exclusively to peaceful 
purposes, and weapons of mass destruction are to be banned from outer space; that assistance 
is to be rendered to astronauts; that states are to be held responsible for their activities in space 
and liable for the damage caused thereby; that owernship of objects is not changed by their 
presence in outer space; that harmful contamination of the environment of the earth, outer 
space, and celestial bodies is to be avoided; that information gathered from activities in outer 
space is to be broadly disseminated; and that stations, installations, etc. on celestial bodies are to 
be open for inspection. 
Dembling & Arons, The Evolutiun of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 419, 456 (1967). 
64. See generally MANUAL, supra note 43, at I-51. 
65. Lachs, Some Refoctiuns un the Law of Outer Space, 9 J. SPACE L. 3, 5 (1981). "The journey into outer 
space ... was inevitable. It was man's urge to penetrate the universe and to discover the secrets of life-
that urge as old as history, recorded by the ancients in the writings of Heraclitus and Polibius." [d. 
66. Galloway, supra note 3, at 21. 
67. As noted by U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, in a special message on transmitting the Outer 
Space Treaty to the U.S. Senate: 
The future leaves no option. Responsible men must push forward in the exploration of outer 
space, near and far. Their voyages must be made in peace for purposes of peace on earth. This 
Treaty is a step - a first step, but a long step - toward assuring the peace essential for the 
longer journey. 
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS; LYNDON B. JOHNSON 150 (1967). 
68. Hearings on the International Control of Outer Space Before the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959) (Statement of Kenneth Keatings). 
69. H. MOREN OFF, WORLD PEACE THROUGH SPACE LAW I (1967). 
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Treaty, however, are not obvious. The principles articulated in the Outer Space 
Treaty are not based on traditional rules of geopolitics. 70 In particular, the 
historical concept applicable to discovery and exploration of land masses on 
earth, namely, the obtaining of sovereignty upon effective occupation of terra 
nullius,71 is conspicuously absent from the treaty.72 
One writer has concluded that the basis for precluding sovereign control in 
space is not to be found in the nature of space itself, but rather in the general 
consensus that by denying states sovereign control over outer space, the interest 
of the world community is best served. 73 The ideal of a cooperative search for 
common good74 found expression in the desire to avoid extending existing legal 
systems with their imperfections and ideological limitations into a universe that 
"potentially offers vistas of a new age for man, an age of peace, cooperation and 
advancement in the fields of science, medicine and philosophy."75 
70. This is not to deny that previously established rules for other media, i.e., air and sea, are 
applicable to certain space activity, or that they will be used. For example, maritime and aviation 
regimes for international carriage provide important references for the development of a code for 
future space transport. See generally DeSaussure, Maritime and Space Law Comparison and Contrast (An 
Oceanic View of Space Transport), 9 J. SPACE L. 93,93 (1981). 
71. Territorium nullius: territory which is not under the jurisdiction of a subject of international law 
G. ScHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 644 (5th ed. 1967). "Under international 
customary law, a state may extend its sovereignty by the effective occupation of territories which are not 
under the jurisdiction of any other subject of international law." !d. at 122. 
72. Menter, Commercial Space Activity Under the Moon Treaty, 7 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &: COM. 213, 214 
(1979). 
73. Goedhuis, supra note 59, at 582. As another writer has noted: "To imagine the opposite of this 
principle, that each state could, and would, make sovereign claims, is to deduce instantly the resulting 
chaotic international situation and to conclude that the framers of the 1967 Treaty were especially 
gifted with foresight in dealing with the question of sovereignty .... " Galloway, supra note 3, at 23. 
74. The concept of a political community embracing all states with a common civilization dates back 
to antiquity "Schemes of international organizations in Europe are as old as the amphicytonic leagues of 
the Greek cities." From the later middle ages onward, European thinkers were preoccupied "with the 
mutual relations of states conceived as a wider community, a preoccupation which gradually developed 
into a search for an institutional framework of peace." C. JENKS, THE WORLD BEYOND THE CHARTER 
21-23 (1969). 
The United Nations is founded on the concept of a world community. Its charter states: "The United 
Nations shall be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of a common end." 
U.N. CHARTER, Preamble. The original purpose of the organization was to maintain international peace 
and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, and to achieve cooperation in the solution of 
economic, social, and humanitarian problems. YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1947-48 at 3 (Office 
of Public Information ed. 1959). 
75. Haley, Parameters of Space Law: Present and Future, in WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAw - THE 
WASHINGTON WORLD CONFERENCE 158 (1967), quoted in N. MATTE, AEROSPACE LAw 43 n.97 (1969). A 
less theoretical basis for the development of cooperation in space law can be advanced. Man's passage 
into space from the outset has depended upon science and technology. Consequently scientists and 
technicians have played a critical role in space programs. As one writer has noted, "(t)he technical 
experts and representatives to international conferences may have more in common with each other 
than with their respective foreign ministries. In view of their common technical background and 
education, shared professional concerns and goals are understandable." Lieve, Essential Features of 
INTELSAT: Applicationsfqr the Future, 9 J. SPACE L. 45, 47 (1981). The first satellite programs of the 
1984] LAw IN A VACUUM 4II 
III. MODERN CONFLICTS IN SPACE LAw AND SPACE USE 
The fundamental principles contained in the Outer Space Treaty are broad 
declarations of international ideals. The drafting of the Outer Space Treaty took 
place during the formative years of the space age, and the drafters of the treaty 
did not directly address specific space activity.76 In addition, space technology 
has progressed beyond the level achieved at the time of the Outer Space Tre-
aty.77 In attempting to formulate specific rules for current space activities, states 
have disagreed on the meaning of the broad declarations of space law. In 
particular, the use of satellites for earth related purposes and the "mankind" 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty have engendered 
controversy among nations. 
A. Satellites and State Sovereignty 
Attempts by the world community to establish rules governing satellites used 
for activities functionally related to earth have been frustrated by the concern of 
some states for their sovereign inviolability. Satellites, presently the most com-
mon form of space use, can be used for purposes of both communication and 
detection. Satellites can effectively monitor a state's territory78 or broadcast radio 
signals over it,79 and the subject state is virtually powerless to stop the invasion of 
its sovereignty.8o This powerful capability, coupled with the current political 
tension between developing and developed nations, as well as between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, has given rise to problems in formulating 
rules for satellite control. While the Outer Space Treaty declares that space is 
free for use by any state,8! the world community has not accepted that freedom 
as absolute. 
United States and Russia were "dominated by mission minded scientists and engineers dedicated to 
international cooperation for peaceful purposes. Political policy makers were able to garner a quick 
harvest of ideas to incorporate in the first formulation of space law." Galloway, supra note g, at 22. 
76. Hahn, Development Toward a Regimefor Control of Remote Sensingfrom Outer Space. 12 J. INT'L L. &: 
ECON. 421, 427 (1977). 
77. That modern space capability is moving increasingly toward a level previously only envisioned in 
science fiction stories is evidenced by this report. 
In a spectacle of bravery and beauty, two American astronauts flew out. up and away from 
the space shuttle Challenger today. Free of any lifelines and propelled into the dark by tiny 
jets. they became in effect the first human satellites. 
The successful test of the propulsion packs - a wirelesss high wire act 170 miles above the 
earth - was an important step toward future operations to repair and service orbiting satellites 
and to maintain large space stations. 
N.Y. Times. Feb. 8. 1984. at I. col. 1. 
78. See infra § III.A.2 for a discussion of remote sensing. 
79. See infra § 1II.A.I for a discussion of direct broadcasting by satellite. 
80. Busak. The Need for an International Agreement on Direct Broadcasting by Satellite. I J. SPACE L. I g9. 
144 (197g). 
81. Outer Space Treaty. supra note 4. at art. 1. 
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1. Direct Broadcast Satellites 
Direct broadcast of television signals by satellite (DBS) is one example of 
current satellite capability.82 Direct broadcast satellites are stationed in orbit to 
receive transmissions from earth and then transmit the signals directly to home 
or community receivers,83 thereby eliminating the need for intermediary earth-
based relay stations.84 DBS has the potential to reach larger geographical areas at 
less cost than conventional broadcast systems85 and is not susceptible to earth-
based jamming techniques.86 Nations could use DBS to enhance global peace by 
expanding the exchange of information between countries and improving the 
educational levels of peoples throughout the world.87 Potentially, DBS could 
promote peace, friendly relations, and understanding among the nations of the 
world.88 
The reluctance of some states to allow broadcasting freely into their territory, 
however, has created problems in formulating rules for DBS.89 Although the 
Outer Space Treaty would seem to allow states unfettered use of space for any 
purpose,90 many states do not accept such a broad interpretation of the treaty. 
Some states91 have asserted an interest in controlling the message content of 
programs broadcast over their territory, particularly if the programming repre-
sents a threat to national security.92 In addition, developing countries, whose 
people lack exposure to the influence of mass media, view DBS as a threat to 
their cultural integrity.93 
82. For more information on the technology involved, see Edelson, Global Satellite Communication, SCI. 
AM., Feb., 1977, at 58-73. 
83. Note, Toward the Free Flow of Information: Direct Television Broadcasting via Satellite, 13 J. INT'L L. & 
ECON. 329, 332 (1978). 
84. Id. at 331. 
85.Id. 
86.Id. 
87. Id. at 335. For example, medical training, environmental control, resource planning, and other 
social services could be provided. The Indian Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE), the 
first major use of telecommunications satellites in a developing country, followed this idea. For four 
hours a day, programs in eight languages were broadcast to residents of remote villages who had never 
before received television. Topics broadcast included family planning, modern agricultural techniques, 
and health and cultural integration. See Report on the Joint UN/UNESCO Regional Seminar on 
Satellite Broadcasting Systems for Education and Development, U.N. Doc. NAC.105/160 (1975). 
88. Report of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites of the Fourth Session, 28 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. NAC.105/l7I, at 6 (1976). 
89. Note, supra note 83, at 336. 
90. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty declares space to be free for use by all states. 
91. E.g., the Soviet Union. See infra text accompanying note 97. 
92. There are some widely recognized restrictions on message content of world-wide broadcasts. For 
example, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights permits certain restric-
tions on broadcasts "necessary for the protection of national security or of public order." Article 20 of 
the Covenant also prohibits "propaganda for war". G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 
U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966). 
93. Note, supra note 83, at 329. 
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The United States, as an advocate of the free flow of programming,94 draws 
support from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.95 That 
article states: "Everyone has the right ... to seek, receive, and impart informa-
tion and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers."96 
The Soviet Union, by comparison, has taken the position that recipient nations 
should have total control of programming content.97 The Soviets would require 
the consent of a receiving state before broadcasts would be permitted over its 
territory, and certain types of programming would be expressly forbidden.98 
The Soviets maintain that any violation of these provisions would allow a state to 
use any means to counteract the illegal broadcast. 99 
UNCOPUOS has been the forum for heated debate over the control and use 
of the new technology,IOO and a working group within the committee has formu-
lated a set of draft principles to govern DBS.lOl Although consensus has been 
reached on several provisions,lo2 a fundamental conflict remains. That conflict 
centers on one issue, namely, whether the prior consent of a receiving state must 
be obtained before any program can be broadcast over its territory.lo3 The 
sensitive nature of the problems posed by DBS and the disagreement by states 
over the fundamental principles involved make any simple solution unlikely.lo4 
2. Remote Sensing Satellites 
The remote sensing of the earth's surface is another area that has engendered 
controversy over guidelines for the control and use of satellites. lo5 Remote 
94. The United States, treating direct broadcast as a broad opportunity for increased exchange of 
world views, advocates no prior consent requirements or other restrictions on direct broadcast. The 
United States encourages the "free and open exchange of ideas" and the "opportunity for all states to 
send as well as receive broadcasts." Draft Principles on Direct Broadcast Satellites, U.N. Doc. 
NAC.105IWG.3(v)lCRP.2(1974). 
95. G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR 74, U.N. Doc. N810 (1948). 
96. Id. The concept of free flow of information is a corollary of an evolving right to communicate. See 
EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE (L. Harms &J. Richstad eds. 1977). "Another 
American concern ... is an overly optimistic, and perhaps somewhat simplistic desire to attain First 
Amendment protection of freedom of speech in international satellite broadcasting." Comment, Direct 
Satellite Broadcasting, 14 HARV. INT'L L. J. 601, 607 (1973). 
97. In 1972, the Soviet Union presented a Draft Convention on Principles Governing the Use by 
States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting. The draft treaty did not mention 
free exchange of information, but vested total control of communication in the recipient nation. See 
U.N. Doc. N8771 (1972). See also Comment, supra note 96, at 607. 
98. The Soviet Union would expressly forbid broadcasts representing interference in intrastate 
conflicts, broadcasts propagandizing violence, horrors, and pornography, or broadcasts undermining 
the foundation of local culture. See U.N. Doc. N8771 (1972). 
99. This would presumably include military retaliation. See Comment, supra note 96, at 610. 
100. Note, supra note 83, at 329. 
101. Text Formulated by the Working Group on Draft Principles for Direct Television Broadcasting, 
U.N. Doc. NAC.105/218. Annex II, (1978). 
102. Note, supra note 83, at 330. 
103.1d. 
104. Id. 
105. DeSaussure,Remote Sensing by Satellite: What Futureforanlnternational Regime', 71 AM.J. INT'L L. 
707,710 (1977). 
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sensing by satellite is a new technology for the acquisition of information about 
objects or phenomena in the surficial environment of the earth through sensory 
devices orbiting in space.106 The sensing satellite uses reflected electromagnetic 
radiation to gather data about conditions on earth.l07 The satellite then transmits 
the data to ground stations for computer processing and analysis. lOR The United 
States launched the first remote sensing satellite in 1972,109 and since that time 
both the United States and Russia have launched several additional satellites. l1O 
The detection of natural resources and conditions on earth is of great practical 
value.u l Remote sensing provides data on otherwise inaccessible areas and can 
provide information on a wide variety of phenomena such as acoustical energy, 
nuclear radiation, and force fields. I 12 Many nations have already benefitted from 
the data provided by remote sensing for such projects as resource management, 
urban monitoring, and coastal mapping.113 In a few years, remote sensing is 
likely to become a major industry.u4 
The central controversy over remote sensing turns on the rights of states to 
control sensitive information about their own natural resources. l1S Two basic 
positions on this issue have evolved. The first position is represented by Argen-
tina, Brazil, France, and Russia.u 6 These states maintain that only the 
"sensed"117 state may determine if, and how, information gathered about it may 
be disseminated.us Proponents of this restrictive theory fear that allowing free 
access to data may threaten the sovereign rights of states to control their own 
106. Recent Development, In Search of a Legal Framework for the Remote Sensing of the Earth frtnn Outer 
Space, 4 B.C.INT'LBe COMPo L. REv. 453, 453 n.1 (198 I), citing N. SHORT, P. LoWMANJR., S. FREDENBe W. 
FINCH JR., MISSION TO EARTH: LANDSAT VIEWS THE WORLD 449 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SHORT Be 
LoWMAN]. 
107. Recent Development, supra note 106, at 454. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
11 O. Id. at 454-455. 
Ill. Hahn, supra note 76, at 422. 
112. See SHORT Be LoWMAN, supra note 106. 
113. E.g., Bangladesh has used remote sensing data to map land accretion in the Bay of Bengal, 
Egypt has used remote sensing data to prospect for iron ore, Iran has employed data to monitor growth 
in Tehran, Thailand now manages its forests with the aid of satellites, and Australia has used the 
technology to map its reefs and shoals. See IfftBe Doyle, Scientific and Legal Asp«ts of Internatianal 
Cooperation in Remou Seruing, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21sT COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAw OF OUTER SPACE 
271, 273 (M. Schwartz ed. 1979). 
114. Recent Development, supra note 106, at 453. 
115. Id. at 457. 
116. Id. 
117. The sensed state is the state whose territory is monitored by satellite. 
118. Recent Development, supra note 106, at 457. 
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resources.u9 Developing nations In particular are susceptible to this threatl20 
because the technology of remote sensing makes possible the collection of infor-
mation about the disposition of natural resources on a global scale}21 Such 
knowledge is a source of international power because it enables a state to 
evaluate the resources and capabilities of other states}22 In addition, states and 
transnational corporations can use data on global resources to direct their for-
eign trade policies or to acquire development rights to resources of which the 
host state is unaware}23 
The opposite view on remote sensing is represented by England, the United 
States, and West Germany}24 These states adhere to an open data theory which 
assumes all states should be free to make use of any information gathered 
through remote sensing.125 The proponents of the open data theory argue that 
any state may use satellites to sense other states without prior permission}26 
The United Nations has been unsuccessful in formulating guidelines reconcil-
ing the two positions.12 7 It is unclear whether the Outer Space Treaty was 
intended to govern remote sensing satellites, and argument on this point con-
tinues within UNCOPUOS.128 To support their position, proponents of the 
open data theory rely on the guarantee of freedom of space for use by all in the 
Outer Space Treaty}29 The United States, acting on its belief that the Outer 
Space Treaty vindicates its action, has made data obtained from its remote 
sensing program available on a worldwide basis.130 
Proponents of the restrictive theory find little support for their position in the 
Outer Space TreatyPI Instead, these states rely on traditional concepts of state 
sovereignty as reasons for limiting the activities of sensing satellites.132 The 
119. [d. at 456. As one author has noted, "what is really at stake is the right of disposal of information 
concerning natural resources, with widely divergent interpretations of state sovereignty at the center of 
the controversy." Su Polter, Remote Sensing and State Sovereignty, 4 J. SPACE L. 99, 106 (1976). 
120. Recently, many Third World countries have shifted strategies aimed at development. Formerly 
the main focus was on attempts to use imported capital to industrialize rapidly. Due to disappointing 
results, however, developing nations have shifted economic policies in favor of natural resource 
development. Crucial to the success of these programs is the establishment of accurate inventories of the 
countries' untapped resources. See Ambrosetti, The Relevance of Remote Sensing to Third-World Economic 
DnJelopment, Some Legal and Political Aspects, 12 N.V.V. J. INT'L L. & POL. 569, 577 (1979). 
121. Hahn, supra note 76, at 422. 
122. [d. 
123. ld. 
124. Recent Development, supra note 106, at 459. 
125. ld. 
126. ld. 
127. Ambrosetti, supra note 120, at 461. 
128. Recent Development, supra note 106, at 461. 
129. [d. at 459. 
130. ld. at 460. 
131. ld. at 458. 
132. ld. at 459. 
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Soviet Union has taken the position that the principle of freedom of outer space 
should not be used as a pretext for violating state sovereign rights on earth. 133 
The Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS has tentatively agreed upon a set of 
draft principles to govern remote sensing activity.135 The draft principlesl36 
would establish a supervisory role for the United Nations in the remote sensing 
field l37 and ensure that data concerning a state's natural resources obtained 
through remote sensing would not be made generally available without the prior 
consent of the sensed nation. 13B UNCOPUOS has worked on the draft principles 
since 1976,139 but despite tentative agreement on some provisions,I4o the basic 
disagreements have not yet been resolved.141 
3. The Geosynchronous Orbit 
A third satellite related activity which has given rise to controversy is the use of 
the geosynchronous orbit. The geosynchronous orbit lies 22,000 miles above the 
earth, encircling the globe directly above the equator.142 Objects placed in this 
orbit and matching the rotational speed of the earth remain fixed above a point 
on it.143 Thus, to an observer on the earth, the object will appear stationary.144 
This characteristic is unique to the geosynchronous orbit and is of great value for 
certain satellite programs. 146 Communication satellites in particular are most 
useful when placed in this orbit,I47 and the future holds promise of even greater 
133. Id. (quoting Vereshetin, On the Principles of State Sovereignty in International Space Law, 2, ANNALS 
AIR & SPACE L. 429, 436 (N. Matte ed. 1977». 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 30-54. 
135. Recent Development, supra note 106, at 462. The working group of UNCOPUOS was in-
structed by the General Assembly to initiate the "drafting of principles in regard to those particular 
areas where common elements in the views of states are identified." G.A. Res. 3388, 30 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 34) at 14, U.N. Doc. AlI0034 (1975). 
136. UNCOPUOS, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the Work of its 19th Session, Annex II and 
Annex 11 appendix, U.N. Doc. AlAC.105I271 (1980). 
137. Id. Principle VII, Annex 11 appendix at 9. 
138. Id. Principle XVI; Annex 11 appendix at 10. 
139. Recent Development, supra note 106, at 462. 
140. !d. at 463. 
141. Id. at 467. 
142. For a technical discussion of the orbit, see United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, Physical Nature and Technical Attributes of the Geostationary Orbit, Study Prepared by 
the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. AlAC.105/203 (1977). 
143. Comment, Orbital Saturation: the Necessityfur International Regulation t!the Geos')"1IChronuus Orbit, 9 
CAL. & WEST. INT'L L. J. 139, 139 n.2 (1979). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 141-46. 
147. Id. Radio waves travel in straight lines. Thus, radio signals cannot be picked up by receivers 
located beyond the line of sight horizon of the transmitter. Although it is possible to communicate 
around the curvature of the earth by "bouncing" radio waves:between the earth and the ionosphere, the 
quality of the signal is poor. A communication satellite, however, can act as a relay station for signals, 
gready improving their quality. While the satellite remains in a fixed position overhead, continuous high 
quality, long distance communication is possible. See generally id. 
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benefits from the orbit.148 Solar power stations, for example, placed in the 
geosynchronous orbit could produce electric power in space and beam the 
energy to earth in the form of microwaves.149 The value of the orbit, however, 
has caused competition among states and a clamor for regulation of the orbit.150 
At present, there is no system for allocating orbital space. 151 Instead, nations 
have unilaterally claimed sectors as needed.152 
On December 3, I 976, a group of equatorial states,153 led by Colombia, issued 
a declarationl54 stating that the geosynchronous orbit was subject to the 
sovereign control of the subadjacent states. 155 The claim was based on a theory 
linking the characteristics ofthe orbit to the gravitational force of the earth .156 In 
addition, the equatorial states argued that the geosynchronous orbit is not 
mentioned in the Outer Space Treaty and thus prohibition against claims of 
sovereignty over space contained in the treaty does not apply to the orbit. 157 
The claim is rejected by almost all other states l58 for two reasons. First, a 
satellite's path through space is affected by a variety of factors other than the 
gravitational pull of the earth.159 Second, while the boundaries of outer space 
have never been clearly defined,160 the geosynchronous orbit must be considered 
part of outer space and within the purview of the Outer Space Treaty.161 
The declaration by the equatorial states reflects more than a dispute over the 
physical boundaries of outer space. The declaration reflects a deeper concern by 
the equatorial states, which are primarily undeveloped states, over the domina-
148. [d. at 145. 
149. [d. 
150. /d. at 140. 
151. [d. at 148. 
152. [d. 
153. The states signing the declaration were Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, 
and Zaire. 
154. Declaration of Bogata, December 3, 1976, reprinted in 6 J. SPACE L. 169, 169 (1978). 
155. [d. 
156. [d. 
157. [d. 
158. Rosenthal, Where Air Space Ends and Outer Space Begins, 7 J. SPACE L. 137, 143 (1979). 
159. [d. 
160. Under the Convention on International Civil Aviation of Dec. 7, 1944 (the Chicago Conven-
tion), 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591. 15 U.N.T.S. 295, each state has complete and exclusive control 
over the ajr space above its territory. But, the question of where air space ends and outer space begins 
has been debated for more than twenty years without definitive result. Proposals for definitions of outer 
space fall into three main categories: 
(I) theories based on the physical characteristic of the earth's atmosphere; 
(2) theories drawing arbitrary lines based on the force of the earth's gravity or on the point at 
which aerodynamic lift yields to centrifugal force; and 
(3) theories based on functional distinctions such as the lowest point a satellite can remain in 
orbit. 
The major problem with these approaches is that none sets an unchanging line that is not subject to 
alteration as science advances. See Rosenthal, supra note 158, at 137-40. 
161. [d. at 142. 
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tion of a limited resource by a few developed states. 162 The geosynchronous orbit 
is becoming saturated with both functioning and nonfunctioning satellites,I63 
and the equatorial states fear that by the time they are able to launch their own 
satellites, the orbit will be too crowded for safety.164 The equatorial states fear 
that under the existing system, the principle of freedom of outer space means 
their interests will not be sufficiently protected.165 
B. The Common Heritage Doctrine and The Moon Treaty 
The controversy over appropriate guidelines for satellite use concerns the 
meaning to be given to the guarantee of freedom of use of space contained in the 
Outer Space Treaty. Opinion is divided on whether freedom of use means total 
freedom or whether states must conduct their space activity with regard for 
traditional notions of state sovereignty.166 Another example of the controversy 
which has arisen over the meaning and scope of a principle of outer space law is 
the criticism some states make of the common heritage provision in the Moon 
Treaty.167 States have not agreed on the precise meaning of the common herit-
age principle, and so some states have been reluctant to ratify the treaty. 
1. The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies 
The decision by the United Nations General Assembly to formulate an agree-
ment governing states' activities on the moon was the result of proposals by 
Argentina and Russia. 168 In response to the proposals, the General Assembly 
adopted a resolution l69 requesting that UNCOPUOS consider the development 
of a draft treaty as a matter of high priority.170 During its 1972 session, the Legal 
Subcommittee formulated a draft agreement,I71 but was unable to reach consen-
sus on a final form for it. 172 During the 17th session of UNCOPUOS' Legal 
162. Lay, Recent Developments in Space Law, 9 CAL. & WEST. 1NT'L L. J. 514, 518 (1979). 
163. The demand on the geosynchronous orbital belt during the last quarter of this century will 
unquestionably be expanded, possibly in excess of the supply of orbital positions. Theoretically, the 
orbit can hold about 1800 satellites without danger of collision. This number is limited by some 
important factors. First, satellites must be placed where they are needed: a satellite must be within direct 
line of sight to the area it serves in order to do its work. Second, there is also the problem of "dead" 
satellites in the orbit taking up room. Together these factors reduce the availability of the orbit for any 
one state. See Comment, supra note 143, at 140. 
164.ld. 
165. Goedhuis, supra note 59, at 588. 
166. See infra § lIl.A. 
167. Moon Treaty, supra note 11. 
168. Griffin, Americans and t~ Moon Treaty, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 729, 734 (1981). 
169. G.A. Res. 2779, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 28, U.N. Doc. N8429 (1971). 
170. Griffin, supra note 168, at 735. 
171. 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 19, U.N. Doc. N8720 (1972). 
172. Griffin, supra note 168, at 735. 
1984) LAw IN A VACUUM 419 
Subcommittee in 1979, the Austrian delegation made a special effort to bring 
about consensus within the subcommittee through informal discussion with 
other members.173 A new draft resulted from these discussions, and the pro-
posed agreement was finally submitted to the General AssemblyY4 On De-
cember 5, 1979, the Moon Treaty was adopted by unanimous vote of the General 
AssemblyY5 It was opened for ratification on December 18, 1979Y6 
The Moon Treaty is similar in form and scope to the Outer Space Treaty and 
reiterates some of the same general principles.177 The stated purpose of the 
Moon Treaty is to provide, on the basis of equality, for the cooperation of states 
in exploring the moon and other celestial bodies,17s to prevent the moon from 
becoming an area of conflict,179 and to define and develop existing agreements 
relating to the moon and other celestial bodies. ISO 
The provision of the Moon Treaty concerning the disposition of lunar natural 
resources was responsible for the seven year negotiating period}SI At first, the 
Legal Subcommittee could not agree whether provisions relating to natural 
resources should be included in the treaty}82 The Soviet Union took the position 
that since exploitation of the moon would not be economically feasible for some 
time, provisions for such exploitation were premature}S3 The United States 
favored the inclusion of such provisions because it believed that future conflicts 
could be avoided by present action.184 
The most important language in the Moon Treaty relating to natural re-
sources is in Article Xl. That article states: "The moon and its resources are the 
common heritage of mankind."185 Article XI also states that an international 
regime is to be established when the exploitation of natural resources in space 
173. Id. at 735. 
174. 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10-12, U.N. Doc. N3420 (1979). 
175. Griffin, supra note 168, at 735. 
176. Id. 
177. For example, the Moon Treaty provides that space use and exploration are for the benefit of all 
mankind. Moon Treaty, supra note 11, art. 11. 
178. Id. at Preamble. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. A full discussion of the provisions of the Moon Treaty is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
For a thorough discussion of the treaty, see generally Note, Space Law - Agreement G(JVerning the 
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 21 HARV. INT'L L. J. 579 (1980). 
181. Griffin, supra note 168, at 743. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 743-44. 
184. Id. 
185. Moon Treaty, supra note II, art. Xl. The paternity of the common heritage concept is often 
attributed to the Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations in a Note Verbale of 17 August 
1967 (U.N. Doc. N6695 (1967)), yet this is not quite accurate. It was in the United Nations Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and not in the Note Verbale. that the expression was first used and 
explained. See Cocca. The Advances in International Law Through the Law '!f Outer Space. 9 J. SPACE L. 13. 15 
(1981). 
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becomes feasible. lss The regime's task will be to oversee the "equitable sharing 
by all states ... in the benefits derived from the moon."IS7 
2. Controversy over Common Heritage 
Although the Moon Treaty should have little difficulty winning support from 
developing countries,1ss acceptance by the Soviet Union and the United States is 
more problematic. ls9 Both the Soviet Union and the United States disagree with 
certain principles set forth in the Moon Treaty. In light of the prominence of 
these two nations in the field of space exploration. the Moon Treaty without 
their support would be of no practical significance. 
Soviet jurists agree with the principle stated in the Moon Treaty that the moon 
and other celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation.190 They 
distinguish, however, between nonappropriation and exploitation of natural 
resources. l9l Arguing that nonappropriation does not preclude exploitation, the 
Soviets draw an analogy to the compatibility of nonappropriation of the high 
seas with the freedom to use its resources.192 One Soviet writer has stated that the 
use of valuable resources on the moon and other planets "will be an important 
factor on the way to prosperity and progress of the society."193 While the Soviets 
believe that there should be freedom of exploitation of space resources, they 
argue there is a need to protect space resources from "irrational and rapacious 
utilization,"194 particularly by "western monopolists."195 
The Soviets believe that the exploitation of space entails responsibility toward 
future generations.19s They have. however, opposed from the outset the propo-
sition that space is the common heritage of mankind.197 Soviet writers argue that 
the concept has no juridical meaning.19s Instead they propose that spac.e be "an 
international area for common use."199 
186. Moon Treaty. supra note 11. art. Xl. para. 5. 
187. Id. art. Xl. para. 7. 
188. The treaty will give developing countries the chance to share in the benefits of space exploration 
or at least to slow down exploitation of the moon until they have the opportunity to play a more 
significant role in space programs. See Note. supra note 180. at 583. 
l89.ld. 
190. Jaksetic. The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Soviet Views. 28 AM. U. L. REv. 483. 503 (1978). 
191. Id. at 503. 
192. /d. 
193. /d. (quoting Vassilevskaia. NoliDns of "Exploration" and "Use" of Natural Resources of Celestial Bodies, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 473 (M. Schwartz ed. 1978». 
194. Jaksetic.supra note 190. at 504 (quoting Vassilevskaia. The Development of the Moon, Some Prospects 
for Regulation by Law, 10 SoVIET L.St GoV'T 362. 365-66 (1972». 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 505 (quoting Dekanov. Some Questions of Juridical Nature of Areas Withdrawn from State 
Sovereignty, 1973 SoVIET V.B. lNT'L L. 214, 215 (1975». 
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The Soviets are apparently seeking a middle ground between the preservation 
of space as the common heritage of mankind and what they perceive as the U.S. 
desire for commercial exploitation of outer space.200 The Soviets are unwilling to 
allow laissez-faire capitalist exploitation of space, but they do appear to accept 
the use of natural resources for nationalistic ends.201 
The position of the United States with regard to the common heritage provi-
sion is less clear than that of the Soviet Union. While the U.S. government 
supported the Moon Treaty during the initial drafting process,202 the strong 
opposition of several special interest groups within the United States has caused 
U.S. support of the treaty to falter. 203 Opponents of the treaty argue that the 
treaty would impose a moratorium on the commercial exploitation of extrater-
restrial resources pending the establishment of an international regime.204 Op-
ponents further contend that the treaty would establish guiding principles for the 
international regime inimical to the interests of private enterprise,205 thereby 
giving other countries political control over commercial exploitation of the 
moon.206 Opponents also express the fear that Third World countries, by seek-
ing to vest control in an international regime, are taking the first step toward a 
major redistribution of the world's wealth.207 Some special interest groups in the 
United States have charged that the treaty is, in effect, an attempt to socialize the 
moon.208 
Due to opposition to the Moon Treaty, the United States has postponed a final 
decision on ratification of the treaty, pending a thorough evaluation of the 
principles contained in it.209 The U.S. reversal in policy toward the Moon Treaty 
has caused confusion within the international community.210 Should the United 
States fail to ratify the treaty, the United States would lose a measure of credibil-
ity and goodwill with some states.211 To avoid this result, the American Bar 
200. Jaksetic, supra note 190, at 505. 
201. Id. 
202. Griffin, supra note 168, at 731. 
203. Id. at 731. Some of the groups within the United States opposing the Moon Treaty are the 
National Association of Manufacturers, the Aerospace Industries Association, the National Ocean 
Industries Association, and individual corporations including United Technologies Inc. and Kennecott 
Copper.ld. at n.167. 
204. Id. at 750. 
205. Id. 
206.ld. 
207. Id. at 753. 
208. Id. at 754. 
209. Id. at 731. Congress has conducted hearings on the issue of United States ratification of the 
Moon Treaty. Set Moon Treaty, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space of the U.S. 
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
210: Griffin, supra note 168, at 759. 
211. Id. 
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Association has proposed a set of declarations and understandings212 which 
could bring the Moon Treaty into closer alignment with U.S. interests.213 
Opposition to the Moon Treaty by the Soviet Union and the United States has 
led to the basic dilemma of the Moon Treaty.214 Without the common heritage 
provision, the Moon Treaty is largely a reiteration of existing treaties.215 With 
the provision, however, the treaty loses its appeal to both the United States and 
the Soviet Union.216 The success of the treaty thus turns on the willingness of the 
United States and the Soviet Union to accept the common heritage provision.217 
C. Political Factors Influencing Space Law 
There are several geopolitical factors exacerbating the controversy over the 
scope of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty. Mention has already 
been made of some of the political factors involved in the debate over satellite 
use and exploitation of lunar resources. 21R In addition, there are two further 
factors influencing the development of outer space law, namely, the failure of 
the United Nations as a forum for international dispute resolution and the 
conflict of national interests among segments of the world community. 
1. The United Nations as an International Forum 
The effectiveness of the United Nations as an international forum for the 
development of space law has declined over the past decade.219 The structure 
and purpose of the United Nations has changed since its inception.220 The 
organization is currently dominated by Third World nations seeking to moder-
nize quickly and hoping to win concessions from the industrialized states to assist 
their modernization.221 Additionally, developing countries fear monopolistic 
control of the world's resources by the more developed states.222 Thus, much of 
212. The American Bar Association, International Law Section, Report to the House of Delegates 5 
(unpublished report submitted to the House of Delegates during the 1980 meeting). See Christol, The 
American Bar Association and the 1979 Moon Treaty: The Search for a Position, 9 J. SPACE L. 77 (1981). 
213. For the full text of the ABA draft proposal, see id. at 90-91. 
214. Note, supra note 180, at 584. 
215. ld. 
216. ld. 
217.ld. 
218. See supra § III.B. 
219. Haanappel, supra note 5, at 149. 
220. Lay, supra note 162, at 517. 
221. ld. "The communications discussions recently held at UNESCO provide an example of this 
philosophy. The underdeveloped nations demanded that the industrialized nations provide for them, 
at no cost, the physical facilities for satellite communications and the education to enable them to utilize 
the facilities." ld. 
222. Goedhuis, supra note 59, at 582. 
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the current work of the United Nations is aimed at protecting the interests 
of underdeveloped countries.223 
Consequently, a situation has arisen in which developed nations are hesitant to 
negotiate at the United Nations since the developing states are in the majority 
there.224 Increasingly, the major powers negotiate bilaterally, later enlisting 
other countries to give the appearance of United Nations consensus to accom-
plished agreements.225 The reduced importance of the United Nations as an 
effective forum for settling international problems is illustrated by the stance 
adopted by the organization on the issue of remote sensing. Due to a lack of 
progress toward a comprehensive treaty governing remote sensing, the United 
Nations has "assumed a role of monitor rather than supervisor of the technol-
ogy."226 
2. Conflict of National Interests 
The failure of the United Nations as an international forum is related to, and 
aggravated by, the divergence of national interests within the world community. 
Negotiations over space law reveal the differences among western industrial 
nations, the Soviet Union and other socialist states, and the Third World group 
of developing countries.227 In negotiations in the international arena, each of 
these groups seeks a result consistent with its own internal political require-
ments.228 
The positions taken by these major groups on international issues generally 
reflect the ideological system to which each group adheres.229 This ideological 
alignment is demonstrated by the positions the groups take in the debate on the 
common heritage doctrine. While the United States seeks laissez-faire industrial 
exploitation of space resources,230 the Soviets seem to favor limited space exploi-
tation by the state.231 By comparison, Third World countries claim, on the basis 
of common ownership, an equal share of any benefits accruing from space 
exploitation.232 The entrenchment by states on these issues has served to inten-
sify the debate over the scope and application of the provisions of the Outer 
Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty. 
In short, outer space law attempts to create a supranational legal framework 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. Lay, supra note 162, at 516. 
226. Recent Development, supra note 106, at 469-70. 
227. Lay, supra note 162, at 517. 
228. Recent Development, supra note 106, at 468. 
229. Recent Development, supra note 106, at 468-69. 
230. Griffin, supra note 168, at 763. 
231. S .. Jaksetic, supra note 190, at 505. 
232. See Griffin, supra note 168, at 753. 
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governing the international community.233 This supranational authority, how-
ever, would imply a permanent limitation on independent national contro\' a 
result the world community has not yet accepted.234 
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF THE COMMON HERITAGE DOCTRINE 
The problems which have arisen in drafting rules of conduct for satellite use 
seem to indicate a failure of space law. Many states have become parties to the 
Outer Space Treaty,235 yet the provision of the treaty which states that outer 
space shall be free for use236 has not been accepted by states as a controlling 
principle.237 Similarly, the reluctance of the major space powers to accept the 
common heritage concept has effectively prevented the Moon Treaty from 
entering into force and has arrested the development of international space 
law.238 As space activity continues to flourish, however, there is an increasing 
need for rules governing the use of outer space. It is therefore important for the 
world community to accept space law principles as viable rules of conduct. 
The principles of freedom of outer space and common heritage can become 
effective legal principles. Space law principles already have a positive effect on 
the world community as expressions of fundamental moral ideals guiding the 
world community toward increased international cooperation.239 More impor-
tantly, in light of additional provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon. 
Treaty, it may be possible for states to accept the principles of freedom of space 
and of common heritage as workable provisions of international law. 
A. Space Law Principles as Moral Ideals 
The majority of legal writers are of the opinion that the common heritage 
doctrine is primarily a reflection of a political aspiration and moral commitment 
which doeS" not represent substantive internationallaw.240 While at present the 
233. Bueckling, The Strategy of Semantics and the "Mankind Provisions" of the Space TreaJy, 7 J. SPACE L. 
15, 21 (1979). 
234. ld. at 22. 
235. Eighty-one countries are currently signatories to the treaty. See TREATIES IN FORCE 345 (Dept. of 
State ed. 1981). 
236. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. l. 
237. See supra § lIl.A. 
238. See supra § IlI.B. 
239. See infra § IV.A. 
240. For example, D. Goedhuis, Chairman of the Space Law Committees of both the International 
Law Association and the World Peace through Law Organization, rejects the view that outer space is 
now recognized as the common heritage of mankind. He argues that an interpretation of this kind 
would oblige every state to share with every other state the advantages and benefits flowing from their 
space activities. In Goedhuis' view this would mean states have "surrendered vital sovereign powers ... 
and have agreed to a fundamental change in the political -structure of international society." See 
Goedhuis. supra note 59, at 583. Additionally, he notes, as it is considered highly likely that there are 
other planets in the universe on which intelligent life exists, a claim by earth inhabitants to a property 
right over all planets "could at the very least be described as hubris." ld. 
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doctrine seems to be merely a vague statement of ideals, vague terms and 
phrases may ultimately ripen into rules of conduct.241 There are two processes 
through which this ripening can take place, the assimilation of international 
concepts into domestic policy242 and the evolution of political realities.243 
1. Assimilation into Domestic Law 
Even without a "supranational legal framework"244 governing the interna-
tional community, space law concepts can influence states' sovereign powers by 
shaping domestic law and policy.245 States, through international agreements, 
may relinquish sovereign power in favor of international bodies or for the 
realization of international purposes.246 In addition, states, in recognition of 
international aspirations, may repeal, create, or alter domestic law and transform 
international ideals into national policy.247 Thus, states have the power to assimi-
late and effectuate international concepts. 
The United States National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958248 (NASA) 
provides an example of this process. A provision249 of that act states: "The 
Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that activities in outer 
space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind."250 
Another section of that act declares that one objective of the U.S. space program 
is "cooperation by the United States with other nations ... in work pursuant to 
this act and the peaceful application thereof."251 These provisions reflect a 
convergence of national legislation with international space law principles.252 
In a similar vein, S. Neil Hosenball, General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, U.S. representative to the 1979 Session of UNCOPUOS, has stated: "I don't think (the common 
heritage of mankind) is a defined term .... I think it would be impossible to come up with a definition 
in the space context." International Space Activities 1979: Hearings BeJore the Subcomm. on Space, Science, and 
Applications of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1979) (Statement of 
Neil S. Hosenball). 
'Set also Larschan &: Brennan, The Common Heritage Principle in International Law, 21 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 303 (1983). The authors conclude, "to date the common heritage concept ... has failed 
to attain legal status erga omnes and remains a political concept." Id. at 304. 
241. Lachs, The Law Making Process for Outer Space, in NEW FRONTIERS FOR SPACE LAw 17 (A. 
McWhinney &: B. Bradley eds. 1969). 
242. Set infra § IV.A.l. 
243. Set infra § IV.A.2. 
244. Set supra text accompanying note 233. 
245. Set generally Vereshchetin, International Space Law and Domestic Law: Problems of Interrelations, 9 J. 
SPACE L. 31 (1982). 
246. Diederiks-Verschoor, Space Law as it Affects Domestic Law, 7 J. SPACE L. 39, 39 (1979). 
247. Vereshchetin, supra note 245, at 37. 
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (Supp. V 1981). 
249. Id. § 2451(a). 
250. Id. 
251. Id. § 2451(c)(7). 
252. In this context it is of interest to note the respective juridical systems of the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, treaties adopted by Congress become the 
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2. Evolution of Global Politics 
As long as the world is divided into sovereign states, national interests will 
continue to dictate foreign policy.253 But, the space age has given rise to an 
overriding interest in both the interdependence of states in space activities and 
the growing convergence of their interests.254 States can reap immense benefits 
from outer space if the priority of independent sovereignty is lessened.255 The 
traditional system of coexistence may be supplemented by the emergence of 
an international system of cooperation. The common heritage doctrine, even if it 
remains only a philosophical aspiration, indicates that mankind is moving slowly 
toward this goal. 256 
There is evidence that the two major space powers have partly accepted a new 
order for outer space. To date, the space age has been characterized by a 
remarkable spirit of international cooperation. From the outset, the original 
space powers, Russia and the United States, did not seek to monopolize space.257 
In the 1960's, the United States opened access to its launch facilities to all nations 
for peaceful purposes.258 In addition, both countries have made the results of 
space research available to the United Nations to be shared with other states.259 
Thus, the major space powers seem to have accepted as a general policy that all 
states should have free access to outer space. Moreover, during the Apollo/Soyuz 
law of the land. But, as Vereshchetin points out, "there is a rule whereby federal statutes prevail over 
existing statutes and treaties." Vereshchetin, supra note 245, at 38. Thus, U.S. domestic legislation can 
override and repeal international agreements. By comparison, under Article 29 of the Constitution of 
the Soviet Union, "relations with other states are based on fulfillment in good faith of obligations arising 
from principles and rules of international law, and from international treaties." This means that all 
organs of state government in the U.S.S.R. are bound by their own constitution to respect rules of 
international law and international treaties. Thus, even without specific domestic legislation, Soviet 
space organizations are bound by international principles of space law. See generally Vereshchetin, supra 
note 245, at 38-40. 
253. Goedhuis, supra note 59, at 586. 
254. [d. 
255. [d. It is worth repeating that the early declaration that space is not subject to national appropria-
tion demonstrates the ability of states to relinquish sovereign rights in favor of international goals. It is 
precisely this sort of action which symbolizes the hope of mankind that through lessons learned in space, 
solutions can be found for problems on earth. It is for this reason that space law has been characterized 
by one writer as "the definitive stage of the development of man within the community." See Cocca, 
supra note 185, at 13. 
256. The power of ideas to gradually shape mankind's affairs has been noted by John Maynard 
Keynes: "The ideas of ... political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, is 
more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. I am sure that the 
power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas." M. 
STEWART, KEYNES AND AFTER 21 (1967) (quoting J. M. KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST AND MONEY (1867». 
257. Galloway, supra note 3, at 24. 
258. Doyle, Significant Develojnnents in Space Law: A Projection for the Next Decade, 9 J. SPACE L. 105, 106 
(1981). 
259. Galloway, supra note 3, at 24. LANDSAT data, for example, has been used by more than 100 
countries to date. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
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program,260 Soviet and American astronauts successfully completed a rendez-
vous of their spacecraft while in orbit, thereby establishing a precedent for future 
cooperative efforts.261 In short, the world community appears genuinely com-
mitted to reserving outer space as a truly international resource. 262 Having 
begun the space age in this fashion, states may well continue to adhere to this 
ideal. 
B. Common Heritage as a Legal Principle 
More important than the moral implications of space law concepts is the 
possibility that the world community may accept the principles of freedom of 
space and common heritage as viable principles of outer space law. The principle 
of freedom of space has not been accepted by states because unrestricted free-
dom of space use for satellites would violate traditional state sovereign interests 
on earth.263 Similarly, the common heritage concept has not been accepted 
because the principle appears to violate some states' property interests.264 In 
both cases, the difficulty countries have had accepting the principles flows from 
the apparent breadth of the principles. Thus, states could accept both principles 
if their potential application were not so broad. Such a compromise can be 
accomplished within the context of existing space treaties and is a necessary step 
for the development of outer space law. 
A possible resolution of the controversy over the freedom of space provision 
of the Outer Space Treaty would be for states to interpret the principle with 
reference to traditional notions of sovereign interests on earth.265 This interpre-
260. "The first international space rendezvous and the handshake between cosmonaut Leonov and 
astronaut Stafford on July 17, 1975, before the eyes of millions of television viewers will go down in the 
history of space travel as an event of prime importance." Bourely, The Legal Framewurk of the Spacelab/ 
Space Shuttle Programs in Comparison with the Apollo/Soyuz Test Program, 4 J. SPACE L. 77, 77 (1976). 
261. ld. 
262. The general acceptance by the world community of a new age in international relations was 
evident even before the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty. During the first launching of objects into 
orbit, the launching states announced their intentions, but did not request permission of overflight from 
the countries whose territories they overflew. The states concerned did not protest the violation of their 
airspace. This practice of not requesting permission to overfly states' territory for objects entering outer 
space has continued, arguably giving rise to a customary right of free passage for space objects. Lachs, 
supra note 241, at 14-15. The apparent acceptance of the principle of free passage reflects the spirit of 
shared common interest and international cooperation which has pervaded the space age from its 
beginning. 
263. See supra § lILA. 
264. See supra § III.B. 
265. Such a solution would accord with accepted international law . A basic principle of international 
law is that a state possesses certain fundamental rights which flow from the state's identity as a sovereign 
power. C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 253-54 (1965). In general these rights are absolute and can be 
freely exercised by a state. There is, however, an additional principle of international law which requires 
states, in the exercise of their rights, to respect the rights of other states. See W. HALL, A TREATISE ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 42 (1884). 
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tation should be possible for two reasons. First, the Outer Space Treaty declares 
that "in the exploration and use of outer space ... states shall conduct their 
activities with due regard for the corresponding interests of [other statesj."266 
Thus, the treaty itself seems expressly to limit the freedom of space use. 
Second, a distinction can be made between "pure" space use and space ac-
tivities functionally related to earth. 267 Outer space law may have abrogated 
sovereign claims in outer space, but it has not eliminated state sovereign control 
on earth.26H Earth related activities should recognize existing principles of state 
sovereignty and be limited accordingly.269 As one author has noted: 
Functional freedom of space does not mean the right to do anything 
one wishes in it without paying attention to consequences, nor does it 
mean the absence of legal rules. Functional freedom should be 
understood as liberty given only in view of certain functions such as 
humanitarian, scientific, exploratory, etc. Similar to national 
sovereignty which is not an absolute power over all man's activities, is 
freedom conceived according to certain determined functions pre-
supposing a limited control,270 
Thus, for example, satellite use for direct broadcasting or remote sensing would 
need to be limited to allow states to exercise control over media broadcast into 
their territory and information about their resources.271 Such limitations on 
satellite use would preserve states' existing rights to protect their independent 
sovereignty from external intervention and would prevent satellite technology 
from becoming a source of international conflict.272 
The principle of common heritage can also be narrowed and made more 
acceptable to its critics. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have been 
reluctant to accept the common heritage principle because the principle, on its 
266. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX. 
267. But see DeSaussure, supra note 105 (argument that such a distinction would only create new 
problems of definition). 
268. Gorove, Sovereignty and the Law of Outer Space, 2 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 311, 321 (1977). 
"Traditional aspects of territorial sovereignty are the ones that have been abolished in relation to outer 
space. The functional aspects, the exercise of sovereign rights and similar manifestations continue to be 
recognized." Id. 
269. Cocca, The Supreme Interest of Mankind vis-a-vis the Emergence of Direct Broadcasting, 2 J. SPACE L. 
83, 83 (1974). 
270. Matte, supra note 75, at 63. 
271. Busak, supra note 80, at 149. As Busak notes: 
Restrictions on broadcast transmissions have a legal basis in international documents. Articles 
32 and 33 of the Montreaux International Telecommunications Convention of 1965,18 U.S.T. 
575, T.I.A.S. No. 6267, permit suspension of international telecommunications and stopping 
information which is dangerous to the security of a receiver state or contrary to their laws, 
public order, or decency .... [The Convention) fully respects the sovereign rights of the 
contracting states in the sphere of information. 
Id. at 148-49. 
272. Id. at 144. 
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face, represents a departure from traditional property law. 273 These two coun-
tries have failed to recognize that outer space is an area res communis,274 requiring 
new ideas about ownership.275 Moreover, the principle of common heritage 
need not be interpreted as confiscatory or unfair. Just as the provision dealing 
with the freedom of space can be limited by traditional principles of state 
sovereignty, so the concept of common heritage may be limited by the principle 
of equity.276 
The provision of the Moon Treaty which contains the common heritage 
provision also establishes an international regime to "oversee the equitable shar-
ing of benefits ... derived from the moon."277 While the equitable sharing 
provision has been criticized by one writer as open to subjective interpretation,27H 
another writer has stated: 
The key concept for realizing the use and benefits of space is 
equity. Benefits cannot flow to the indolent. Non-contributors can 
take no measure of satisfaction from the labors of others. Oppor-
tunities must be nondiscriminatory and there must be a possibility 
for all to contribute to and share in endeavors in space. But returns 
must reflect contributions. There is no "free lunch."279 
Further clarification of equitable sharing can be drawn from the Moon Treaty 
itself. The provision280 establishing the regime to oversee equitable sharing 
declares that "the interests and needs of developing countries as well as the 
efforts of countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the 
exploration of the moon shall be given special consideration."2Hl Thus, equitable 
sharing would mean a state's investment in space programs would be taken into 
account in determining that state's share of space benefits. It would also mean 
that no state wishing to participate in space programs could be prevented from 
273. See supra § IlI.B. 
274. "Res communis: In the civil law, things common to all: that is, those things which are used and 
enjoyed by everyone, even in single parts, but can never be exclusively acquired as a whole. E.g., light 
and air." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (1979). 
275. Matte, supra note 75, at 361. A special status must be given economic uses of space .... 
Here also the old ideas of law ... must make way for a new law, conceived by new mentalities and on 
bases which do not stop at the frontiers of states. We must envisage a new law which should be 
transnational and international at the same time. 
Id. 
276. Equity is used in this sentence to mean an overall system of fair distribution, rather than in 
reference to the specific Anglo! American system of equity jurisprudence. This meaning for eqUity can 
be defined as "the giving or desiring to give to each man his due." See WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH 
CENTURY DICTIONARY 618 (2d ed. 1966). 
277. Moon Treaty,supra note II, art. XI. 
278. Griffin, supra note 168, at 762. 
279. Doyle, supra note 258, at 110. 
280. Moon Treaty, supra note 11, art. Xl. 
281. Id. at para. 7(d). 
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doing SO, and that states with space capabilities would have some duty to share 
that technology with other states.282 In short, the requirement of equitable 
sharing could limit the common heritage concept sufficiently to make the princi-
ple acceptable to states with existing space program, while preserving oppor-
tunities for developing countries to participate in the benefits of outer space. 
The world community is on the threshold of a great expansion in the exploita-
tion of celestial resources.283 Rather than each state unilaterally determining its 
obligations to other states in space, fundamental principles are needed to guide 
sp2.ce activities uniformly.284 The common heritage concept, limited by the 
principle of equitable sharing, could provide the necessary guiding principle. 
The United States, as a major space power, should take the lead in formulating 
understandings285 on the meaning of common heritage. By doing so, the United 
States could secure its own interests in the commercial exploitation of outer 
space and facilitate acceptance of the Moon Treaty by the world community. 
Acceptance of the Moon Treaty would ensure the continued international coop-
eration which has characterized the space age from the outset and which has 
distinguished space law as a truly revolutionary chapter in the affairs of man-
kind.2s6 
v. CONCLUSION 
Outer space law developed as a result of efforts by the United Nations follow-
ing the successful launch of the first earth orbiting satellite by the Soviet Union in 
1957. The General Assembly of the United Nations established a standing 
committee to provide an international forum for discussion of matters relating to 
space and to oversee the exclusive reservation of outer space for peaceful pur-
poses. The early work of the committee resulted in the first international agree-
282. Lachs, supra note 241, at 28. That the United States has already accepted these basic ideas is 
demonstrated by the fact that the United States has shared space benefits and space technology with 
other states. See supra text accompanying notes 257-60. 
283. Menter, supra note 2, at 65. 
284. ld. 
285. These understandings could take the form proposed by the American Bar Association for the 
Moon Treaty, namely, understandings of the meaning of treaty provisions included with ratification. 
See supra text accompanying notes 212-13. 
286. The world community can only benefit from continued international cooperation in outer 
space. As one writer has noted: 
What is the legacy of the quarter-century (since the launch of Sputnik I)? If I can put it 
into one word, it is globalism. Forced into our unwilling minds has been a view that presents 
Earth and humanity as a single entity .... Globalism offers us the hope of a greater, wider and 
better civilization, with more versatility and flexibility, drawing on larger resources, and no 
longer imprisoned on the surface of a single world. 
If we consider the alternatives - localism and death versus globalism and life - it may be 
that one or two of us will join the sane minority and choose life. And if enough of us do so, the 
sane may not even be a minority and may enforce the choice - and that will be the legacy of 
the Space Age. 
Asimov. Sputnik's ugacy: Glnbalism, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1982, at 25, col. 3. 
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ment government space use, the Outer Space Treaty, which is widely accepted as 
the basic charter for outer space. 
Although the Outer Space Treaty is commendable for its attempt to foster 
international cooperation, the subsequent growth of space law has faltered. The 
advent of extensive satellite programs during the 1970s has given rise to conflict 
among nations attempting to formulate specific rules for space activity. Some 
states have not accepted as absolute the broad declaration of the Outer Space 
Treaty that space is free for use by all states. This is particularly so in the area of 
satellite use for earth related purposes. Instead, some states have taken the 
position that space activities functionally related to earth must be carried out 
with respect for traditional notions of state sovereign control over territory. 
These difficulties of interpretation have resulted in a deadlock between nations 
seeking to formulate rules governing direct television broadcasting and remote 
sensing by satellite. 
A similar problem of interpretation has arisen over the Moon Treaty. The 
Moon Treaty is a recent attempt to expand the scope of outer space law by 
declaring that the natural resources of outer space are the common heritage of 
mankind. The broad principle of common heritage, however, has not been 
unanimously accepted by the world community. Developed states have been 
reluctant to accept what they see as an attempt by developing states to force a 
division of benefits accruing from space exploitation. Uncertainty over the mean-
ing of common heritage has caused both the Soviet Union and the United States 
to defer ratification of the Moon Treaty, thereby effectively preventing the 
treaty from entering into force. 
Despite the controversies over the principles of freedom of space and common 
heritage, a resolution of the problems consistent with existing principles of space 
law is possible. The author suggests that space activities functionally related to 
earth should respect traditional notions of state sovereign control over territory. 
Similarly, the division of benefits accruing from space exploitation should be 
in accordance with traditional notions of equity. There is support for these 
suggestions in the literature on space law and in the language of the Outer Space 
Treaty and the Moon Treaty. These requirements could reduce the conflict 
which has arisen over the interpretation of space law principles. Moreover, they 
would ensure the flexibility which space law needs to remain a viable branch of 
international law and to meet the future challenges arising from mankind's 
continued exploration and use of outer space. 
Scott Ervin 
